Fordham Law Review
Volume 66

Issue 6

Article 9

1998

Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights
Christine L. Feiler

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christine L. Feiler, Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
2435 (1998).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights
Cover Page Footnote
J.D., Candidate, 1999, Fordham University. This Note is dedicated to my parents, William and Louise Feiler,
in gratitude for their constant love and support throughout my education. Special thanks to Gianfranco
Arena for his untiring encouragement during the writing of this Note.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/9

HUMAN EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION:
REGULATION AND RELATIVE RIGHTS
Christine L. Feiler*
INTRODUCTION

Reproductive rights and technologies have been at the forefront of
politics and science in recent decades.' The development of contraception,2 abortion, 3 and-most recently-cloning 4 have challenged
the moral and ethical beliefs of many Americans. Human embryo5
research has likewise fueled ongoing debate within scientific, ethical,
and legal circles.6
The development of in vitro fertilization ("IVF'), an assisted reproductive technique in which fertilization is accomplished outside the
mother's body,7 first made human embryos available for scientific re* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University. This Note is dedicated to my parents, William and Louise Feiler, in gratitude for their constant love and support
throughout my education. Special thanks to Gianfranco Arena for his untiring encouragement during the writing of this Note.
1. See generally Robert Blank & Janna C. Merrick, Human Reproduction,
Emerging Technologies, and Conflicting Rights (1995) (discussing medical advances,
political responses, changing social values, and novel legal cases which currently challenge conventional notions of reproductive rights and create policy dilemmas).
2. "Contraception" refers to means or methods of preventing pregnancy and resulting birth. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 2 (1994). Recent advances,
however, have blurred the line between abortion and contraception. Id. For example,
the controversial "abortion pill," RU-486, induces abortion without surgical intervention, but is categorized as a form of contraception. Id.
3. The legal definition of "abortion" is the termination of a human pregnancy for
a purpose other than production of a live birth or removal of a dead embryo or fetus.
Id. § 1 (citing the Revised Uniform Abortion Act).
4. "Cloning" is a developing scientific technique which produces an exact copy of
a molecule, cell, or individual plant or animal. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings Appendix-1 (1997) (discussing scientific, religious, legal,
and public policy implications of human cloning) [hereinafter Cloning Report], available at <http.//bioethics.govlbioethics/pubs.html>. This technology dominated headlines in October of 1996, when Ian Wilmut reported the successful cloning and live
birth of a sheep named "Dolly." Id. at 1.
5. The term "embryo" signifies the developing human organism from the time of
fertilization until the eighth week of gestation, when it becomes known as a "fetus."
National Institutes of Health, Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel D-4
(1994) [hereinafter NIH Panel Report]. But cf infra note 248 (discussing the inconsistent use of these terms in state statutes).
6. See, e.g., Jonathan Van Blerkom, The History CurrentStatus and Future Direction of Research Involving Human Embryos, in National Institutes of Health, Papers
Commissioned for the Human Embryo Research Panel 1. 7 (1994) (discussing the
controversy surrounding Peter Braude's 1988 Nature study in which human embryos
were created solely for the purpose of studying biochemical regulation of embryo
development).
7. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at D-6. During the IVF medical protocol, a
woman is treated with hormones to induce ovulation, her eggs are surgically retrieved
and fertilized with sperm in vitro, and the resulting embryos are transferred to her
uterus for implantation. Andrea L. Bonnicksen, In Vitro Fertilization: Building Policy
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search purposes.' In 1978, Patrick Steptoe and Robert Edwards reported the first live birth made possible by IVF technology. 9 Four
years later, they announced plans to freeze "spare" embryos leftover
from these procedures for potential clinical or laboratory use.10
Embryos are currently utilized in two primary areas of investigation: (1) basic or laboratory research, which seeks to identify and explore the underlying biological principles and processes of
embryological development; and (2) IVF development, which attempts to modify clinical or laboratory techniques used in assisted reproduction protocols." Most work in the United States has focused
on the latter, attempting to increase the frequency of pregnancy associated with laboratory-assisted conception.' 2 Another growing area of
research involves the embryo as "patient,"' 3 and includes techniques
such as gene therapy 4 and pre-implantation diagnosis.' 5
Researchers typically acquire embryos from couples who have undergone fertility treatment and voluntarily donate extra embryos that
they do not wish to implant. 6 An alternate source of these entities,
however, is the deliberate fertilization and harvesting of embryos expressly for experimental use. 17 In this age of scientific progress, purposeful production of embryos may be the only way to satisfy
From Laboratories to Legislatures 147-51 (1989). For a full description of this technology, its history, and its public policy implications, see generally id.
8. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 180.
9. Id.
10. Id. During IVF treatment, the physician may fertilize more embryos than will
be implanted. Bonnie Steinbock, Ethical Issues in Human Embryo Research, in National Institutes of Health, Papers Commissioned for the Human Embryo Research
Panel 27, 33-34 (1994). Such over-fertilization raises important choices for the individual or couple who has undergone treatment, including whether to destroy the
"spare" embryos, donate them for research, or donate them to other couples. See
Bonnicksen, supra note 7, at 37-38.
11. Van Blerkom, supra note 6, at 8; see infra Part II.B (providing a more extensive discussion of research areas).
12. Van Blerkom, supra note 6, at 8.
13. Steinbock, supra note 10, at 27-28.
14. Gene therapy is a developing technique that alters the genetic makeup of the
subject, in an attempt to correct defects in the individual (somatic cell gene therapy)
and perhaps even future offspring (germ-line gene therapy). Id. at 28. Somatic cell
gene therapy could be used to treat an embryo with a defective gene, by replacing the
abnormal cells with corrected stem cells. Id. While such treatment would not prevent
the same disease in that embryo's future offspring, germ-line gene therapy introduces
into the genetic makeup of an individual changes that are passed on to at least one
generation. Id. (noting that germ-line gene therapy has never been attempted on
human embryos due to unpredictable potential side effects).
15. Pre-implantation diagnosis involves the removal and biopsy of several cells
from a developing embryo in vitro to identify the existence of genetic disease. Id. at
27-28. Such testing does not seek to treat the embryo; rather, it avoids the implantation of "defective" embryos simply by discarding them. Id. at 28, 38.
16. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at xiii.
17. Id. In other words, researchers fertilize embryos for their own use in experiments, not for individuals' use in becoming parents.
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expanding research needs.'" Despite considerable public concern,1 9
however, there are currently no national standards to limit how scientists may acquire embryos for this type of experimentation, nor guidelines to govern how such research shall be conducted in the United

States.2
In response to this unresolved controversy, this Note advocates a

uniform federal ban on the creation of human embryos for use in in-

vestigational embryo research."1 Part I considers the legal status of

the embryo as it has been determined in other reproductive contexts,
and ultimately distinguishes embryo research from those contexts.
Further, it introduces the relative rights which must be considered in
designing regulation of research embryo" experimentation. Part II
evaluates these competing rights from both sides of the embryo research debate and argues that the balancing of these interests requires
that scientists be prevented from creating embryos solely for scientific
use. Part III examines the manner and extent to which existing federal and state laws protect the interests outlined above and identifies
18. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 180; see Part II.B (discussing research areas
for which deliberately fertilized embryos are important).
19. See Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 13 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. LJ.517, 518 (1997) (-.Lack of a
national policy [regarding reproductive technologies] has resulted in ...exploitation
and commercialization of one of the most valued and personal aspects of our society."); Mary Cantwell, Editorial, Should We Make Research Embryos? No. Humans
Are Not Lettuces, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1994, at A36; David Walsh, Benefits Don't
Make it Ethical, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1994, at A23.
20. Other countries, such as France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
subject human embryo research to strict oversight. See Conceiving the Embryo: Ethics, Law and Practice in Human Embryology 303-49 (Donald Evans ed., 1996). In the
United Kingdom, for example, the Human Embryo Fertilisation and Embryology Act
("HIFE Act") governs embryo experimentation. Id. at 303. The HFE Act requires
licensing of all such research projects and limits the purpose for and the time frame in
which embryos may be used. Id at 308-09.
21. This Note uses the term "investigational embryo research" to mean tests, techniques, or procedures which are designed to increase the knowledge of the researcher
or scientific discipline, but are not intended to diagnose or improve the life or health
of the embryo or individual biological parent, and which result in the destruction of
the embryo. This Note does not advocate restriction of "therapeutic research"-including gene therapy, supra note 14-performed on existing embryos, which is intended to benefit the embryo. See Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 177-78.
Nor does this Note address research conducted on "spare" or "surplus" embryos,
which are embryos left over from IVF procedures and voluntarily donated by parents
for experimental use. Different constitutional issues and ethical arguments arise with
respect to experiments conducted with these embryos. See NIH Panel Report, supra
note 5, at 42 (observing that many who oppose the creation of research embryos tolerate research conducted with spare embryos, because the latter may be justified as the
byproduct of otherwise well-intentioned attempts to conceive healthy children);
Steinbock, supra note 10, at 29 (suggesting that, under certain conditions, even those
who believe that the unborn have equal status with children might not object to experimenting on, as opposed to discarding, spare embryos); inifra note 97 (noting potential reproductive autonomy implications of research with spare embryos).
22. This Note uses the term "research embryo" to refer to an embryo created
solely for use in investigational embryo research.

2438

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

their limitations and inadequacies. Part IV then proposes a federal
statute to prohibit the creation and exploitation of research embryos
and correct the problems identified in existing legislation.
I.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EMBRYO

The embryo itself is the necessary starting point for any discussion
of research regulation: What is it and why should (or shouldn't) it be
protected? Answers to these difficult questions have elicited both
condemnation and endorsement of human embryo research.2 3 The
scholarly disagreement over the moral worth and legal status of the
embryo is mirrored in our nation's courts, which currently afford disparate treatment to embryos in a variety of reproductive contexts.2"
These treatments necessarily influence both attitudes toward, and regulation of, human embryo research. 5

This Part introduces some of the recent federal and state decisions
which have considered the legal status of the embryo in the context of
abortion and IVF disputes. As a problem separate and distinct from
both abortion and IVF, however, research involving deliberately fertilized embryos implicates different legal issues and requires independent analysis. This discussion proceeds to introduce the rights
and interests that must be considered in designing regulation of this
complex area of scientific activity.
A. Abortion Law
The legal status of the unborn was most notably evaluated in Roe v.

Wade.26 In Roe, the United States Supreme Court struck down a
Texas statute that criminalized abortion except in life-threatening circumstances.2 7 The majority held that the right to privacy, arising from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protected a

woman's interest in obtaining an abortion.2" Writing for the majority,

23. Compare, e.g., Hadley Arkes et al., The Inhuman Use of Human Beings: A
Statement on Embryo Research by the Ramsey Colloquium, 49 First Things 17 (January 1995) <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9501/ramsey.html> [hereinafter The
Ramsey Colloquium] (outlining pro-life opposition to human embryo research and
critiquing the Human Embryo Research Panel Report), with John A. Robertson, In
the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 Va. L. Rev. 437, 444-47 & n.30
(1990) (outlining the viewpoint that supports embryo research).
24. See Lal, supra note 19, at 526; infra note 37.
25. See infra text accompanying note 33; see also George J. Annas et al., The Politics of Human-Embryo Research - Avoiding Ethical Gridlock, 334 New Eng. J. Med.
1329, 1329 (1996) (observing that medical ethics are held "hostage" by the unresolved
abortion debate and arguing that embryo research must be disentangled from this
divisive political issue to achieve much-needed compromise).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see generally John A. Robertson, GestationalBurdens and
Fetal Status: Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 Am. J.L. & Med. 189 (1987) (discussing the
impact of Roe).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
28. Id. at 153.
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Justice Blackmun denied that the unborn were "persons" within the

meaning of the Constitution,2 9 but acknowledged that the State's in-

terest in protecting fetal life was sufficiently compelling to limit the
right to abortion under certain conditions.3" Protection of unborn life
can never be absolute, however, because of the competing Constitutional rights of women. Roe's holding was later affirmed in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,' where the Court established an "undue burden" test to determine whether state regulation of abortion is
permissible.3 2

Roe and its progeny "loom[ ] heavily in the background of any discussion of policies regarding research on conceptuses [embryos and
fetuses]." 33 These cases do not, however, dispose of the embryo research debate. The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence does not
29. Id at 156-58. Although the Constitution does not define "'person" in so many
words, its usage of the term
has application only postnatally. None [of the Constitutional references to
person] indicates, with any assurance, that [person] has any possible prenatal application.
[T]his, together with our observation ... that throughout the major portion of the 19'h century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than
they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.
Id. at 157-58.
30. Id. at 163-64. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the State has two "separate and distinct" interests: preserving and protecting the health of pregnant women,
and protecting the potentiality of human life. Id. at 162. The former interest becomes
compelling at the end of the first trimester, at which point the State may regulate
abortion to the extent it "reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health." Id. at 163. The State's interest in unborn life, however, becomes
compelling only at the point of viability, when the fetus is "presumably" capable of
"meaningful" life outside the mother's body. Id. The State may pursue this interest
even to the point of proscribing abortion after viability, except where abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64.
PlannedParenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court affirmed that "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus ...." 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added). The Court retained viability as the point before which a woman has the right
to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 870-71. The Court abandoned Roe's trimester
framework, however, and held that the State's interest in protecting fetal life justifies
[e]ven in the earliest stages of pregnancy ... rules and regulations designed
to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the
pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of State assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.
Id. at 872. Roe's rigid structure was deemed "incompatible with the recognition that
there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughoutpregnancy." Id. at 876
(emphasis added).
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 878-79. "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." ht. at 877.
33. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1,at 176 (quoting Lori B. Andrews, one of the
advisors to the NIH Panel, see infra note 248).
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prohibit the government from granting rights to fetuses or embryos; it
merely holds that the Constitution does not obligate the government
to do so. 4 Such rights, however, must not unduly interfere with con35
stitutionally protected interests, such as a woman's right to abortion.
As one commentator has noted:
[Blackmun's] opinion did not try to assign a precise moral or legal
status to fetal life. It merely identified the upper bounds of that
status (i.e., it is not protected by the equal protection clause), which
was sufficient for cases that balanced clearly protected rights of
pregnant women against fetal interests. This is precisely why the
1973 Roe decision . . .still leave[s] it to the legislative branch to
determine3 6 whether embryos can be killed in the name of scientific
progress.

Thus, the Court's abortion jurisprudence does not limit the legislatures' power to define the scope and permissibility of investigational
embryo research in years to come.
B.

IVF Law

Recent disputes have also given the courts an opportunity to consider the legal status of the embryo in the IVF context. Federal and
state courts have given differing treatment to embryos that were subjects of IVF controversies. 7
In York v. Jones,38 a couple sued for the return of a single frozen
embryo held in storage by their Virginia IVF clinic after the clinic
refused to transfer it to the couple's California fertility specialist. 3 9 At
the start of their IVF treatment, the Joneses signed a "Cryopreservation Agreement" with the fertility clinic that detailed their respective
rights to the excess embryos.40 The Eastern District of Virginia held
34. R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of the Embryos,
Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women, 6:2 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 11, 20 (1995).

35. Id. But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (voicing the opinion of
four Justices that the Constitution does not, in fact, guarantee a right to abortion);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's result as
unfounded in the Constitution). This Note recognizes that the right to abortion is
protected as fundamental under the current majority's abortion jurisprudence and
attempts to operate within the constraints of that holding. It does not, however, endorse that premise or presume that the issue is immune from future consideration by
the Court.
36. Charo, supra note 34, at 20.
37. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (construing embryos as
property); Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989) (treating embryos as children), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that embryos occupy an
"interim category" with symbolic value as potential life), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
38. 717 F. Supp 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
39. Id. at 424.
40. Id. at 424-25. The contract stated that if the Joneses no longer wished to attempt pregnancy, their embryos could be "1) donated to another infertile couple,....
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that the contract created a valid bailment relationship between the
couple and the clinic. 4' Furthermore, the court acknowledged that
embryos were properly considered "property" for the purposes of
such contracts.42 The couple's property and "possessory interest[s]" in
the embryo-rather than any rights or interests of the embryos themselves-were the controlling considerations in the court's decision to
return the embryo to the Yorks.4 3
The Tennessee Supreme Court criticized this treatment of the embryo as property in Davis v. Davis.' Davis began as a divorce action,
in which the parties were able to agree on all terms of dissolution,
except one: who was to have "custody" of the seven frozen embryos
that the couple had deposited with a fertility clinic during earlier attempts to conceive a child.4 5 Mary Sue Davis originally requested
control of the embryos so that she might have them implanted in her

own uterus, in "a post-divorce effort to become pregnant." 4 Her husband objected, desiring that the embryos remain in their frozen state
until he decided whether he wanted to become a parent outside of
their marriage.4 7

The trial court held that the embryos should be treated as children
for the purposes of this custody dispute," and awarded them to Mrs.
Davis.4 9 The judge further instructed that Mrs. Davis "be permitted
the opportunity to bring [these children] to term through implantation."50 The appellate court reversed and awarded "joint control...
[and] equal voice over [the embryos'] disposition" to both spouses."
2) donated for approved research investigation, [or] 3) thawed but not allowed to
undergo further development." Id. at 424. The clinic argued that the Jones' proprietary right to the embryos were limited to those "three fates" enumerated in the agreement and did not include inter-institutional transfer of the embryos. I. at 425.
41. Id. at 425. A bailment relationship exists under Virginia law wherever there
"is the element of lawful possession however created, and duty to account for the
thing as the property of another .... " Id. (citing Crandall v. Woodward, 143 S.E.2d
923, 927 (Va. 1965)). When the purpose of the bailment has terminated, the bailee is
under an absolute obligation to return the subject matter of the bailment to the
bailor-a duty implied from the fact of lawful possession of another's personal property. Id. at 425.
42. Id. at 424-25.
43. Id at 425-27.
44. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
45. Id at 589.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), afil, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that embryos occupy an "interim category" with
symbolic value as potential life), cerL denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 at *3 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13. 1990),
affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that embryos occupy an -interim category" with symbolic value as potential life), cert. denied. 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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The court cited York in support of its holding,52 but failed to explicitly
define the Davis' interest in the embryos. 3
Dissatisfied with both lower court conclusions, the Tennessee
Supreme Court set out to clarify the legal status of the embryo.5 4 The
court looked to the American Fertility Society's Ethics Committee
Report, which outlined three interpretations of the embryo's legal status: the embryo as "a human subject after fertilization, which requires
that it be accorded the rights of a person;"5 5 2)"no different from any
other human tissue";56 and 3) "an intermediate [entity, which] ... deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissues but not the
respect accorded to actual persons."5 7
The court rejected the first option, noting that embryos did not enjoy the status of "persons" under state tort law58 or federal abortion
jurisprudence.5 9 The court also denied that embryos were "property."6 0 Rather, the court concluded that embryos "occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life."61 Both spouses were held to have equivalent "decision-making authority" over the disposition of the embryos.6 2 The
court further commented that any proposed state interest in preserving the life of the embryos "is at best slight . . . . When weighed
against the interests of the individuals and the burdens inherent in
parenthood, the state's interest in [ ] potential life ...is not sufficient
to justify any infringement upon the freedom of these individuals 63
to
make their own decisions as to whether to ... becom[e] parents.
52. Id.
53, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (observing the appellate
court's lack of further analysis), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
54. See id. at 596-97.
55. Id. at 596 (citing the Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The court referred to the Tennessee Wrongful Death statute, which did not
allow such actions for death of a fetus unless it was first born alive. Id. at 594.
59. Id. at 595.
60. Id. at 597.
61. Id.
62. Id. The court then balanced the parties' relative interests: Mrs. Davis's right
to procreate versus Mr. Davis's right to avoid procreation. Id. at 603.
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by
means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable
alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to
achieve pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the
objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.
Id. at 604. Because Mrs. Davis had later decided that she wanted to donate the embryos, rather than implant them in herself, Mr. Davis's right to avoid genetic
parenthood controlled. Id.
63. Id. at 602.
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The New York state appellate division recently considered a similar
controversy in Kass v. Kass.64 After unsuccessful IVF treatments and
a failed marriage, the parties were left with surplus embryos,1'5 as in
the Davis dispute. 66 Mrs. Kass wanted possession to attempt future
pregnancy and Mr. Kass objected.67 Unlike the Davises," however,
the Kasses had signed an informed consent agreement at the time of
the fertility treatments. 69 This document effectively donated the disputed embryos to the IVF clinic for use in approved research
activities.7 °
The trial court held that the agreement was not controlling and
awarded the embryos to Mrs. Kass with the "exclusive right to determine [their] fate"-including their use in another attempt to achieve
pregnancy. 71
' The Appellate Division reversed.' The court held that
the parents' mutual intent regarding the disposition of the embryos, as
evidenced by the informed consent document, should be given effect.73 While the trial court endorsed the view of the Davis court that
the embryos were something more than property but less than persons,74 the Appellate Division did not reconsider the legal status of
the embryos themselves. 75 Rather, the parents' joint decisional authority over these entities was the paramount and controlling
consideration.76
In light of these differing conceptions of the embryo, some commentators have called for federal legislation to clarify the embryo's
64. 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997).
65. I. at 583.
66. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
67. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
68. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
At the outset, it is important to note the absence of [a] critical factor[ I that

might otherwise influence or control the result of this litigation: [the
Davises] did not execute a written agreement specifying what disposition
should be made of any unused embryos that might result from [their IVF

treatment].
Id
69. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583. The informed consent document provided that if

the couple disagreed over the disposition of the remaining embryos, the IVF clinic
would use them for approved research and investigation. Id. at 588. It explicitly

stated that, "[o]ur frozen [embryos] will not be released from storage for any purpose
without the written consent of both of us." Id. at 587 (emphasis omitted).
70. See id at 584.
71. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Jan. 18, 1995) (unpublished
decision), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997).

72. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
73. Id.
74. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2-3.

75. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 587 ("Since we conclude, in accordance with the
analysis employed in Davis, that the agreement of the parties is dispositive of the

present controversy, no further discussion of the facts of that case is material or
relevant.").

76. See id at 590.
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legal status to avoid future confusion and inconsistency in the law.7 7
Despite disagreement over the legal status of the embryo, however,
the IVF precedents do share some common ground. They confirm
that the biological parents' joint interest in determining what will78happen to the embryos is the primary concern in any IVF dispute.
C. Embryo Experimentation
The federal courts recently had an opportunity to consider the legal
status of the embryo as the subject of scientific research. In Doe v.

Shalala,7 9 the plaintiffs"° filed a class action suit on behalf of the more
than 20,000 embryos stored in various IVF labs across the United
States.81 Before the National Institutes of Health Human Embryo
Research Panel (the "Panel") published its findings,82 plaintiffs asserted that the Panel was not "fair[ly] balance[d]" within the meaning
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA").83 They alleged
that at least ten of the Panel members were "current or former NIH
grantees who [had] firmly endorsed the principle and many of the protocols of extended and unfettered human embryo research."'
Arguing that the Panel's potential favorable recommendations for
the funding of embryo research would cause them irreparable harm,8 5
77. Lal, supra note 19, at 528; see also Douglas J. Cusine, Experimentation: Some
Legal Aspects, in Experiments on Embryos 120, 123 (Anthony Dyson & John Harris
eds., 1990) ("What I have been suggesting for a long time is that we need some kind
of legislative clarification. It is highly irresponsible for a government to allow people
involved in human reproduction to operate in legal darkness." (commenting on confusion over the status of embryos in England prior to adoption of the HFE Act)).
78. See generally York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that the
parents' possessory interests in the embryo required that the clinic consent to transfer); Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (holding that the parents' mutual intent as evidenced
in the informed consent document controlled the disposition of surplus embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the parents' joint decisional
authority over the embryos controlled their disposition), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
79. 862 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994).
80. The representatives of the class were Mary Doe, "a pre-born child in being as
a human embryo," the "Michael Fund," a pro-life research organization, and Michael
Polincastro, an adult suffering from Down's syndrome. Id. at 1423.
81. Id.
82. After Congress lifted procedural barriers to the funding of human embryo research, the National Institutes of Health assembled the Human Embryo Research
Panel to determine whether and to what extent the federal government should finance this type of experimentation, with the expectation that their report would form
the basis for final funding decisions. See infra Parts II, III.A (further explaining the
NIH Panel and its findings).
83. Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1425. This Act requires that "the membership of [an]
advisory committee ... be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented
and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee." FACA, 5 U.S.C.A.
App. 2 § 5(b)(2) (West 1996).
84. Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1425.
85. Plaintiffs alleged that Mary Doe and the other embryos would be deprived of
"the right to life without due process of law," that the Michael Fund would lose other-
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the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to halt further Panel deliberation and publication of the Report before a trial on the merits.'t
The federal district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing., The
court based its opinion on the familiar Roe and Casey holdings that
the unborn are not "persons" with legally assertable rights.'

Thus,

the plaintiffs could not maintain a class action on their behalf.8 9
The Doe opinion did not consider whether the embryos deserved
different treatment-or legal opportunities-as the subjects of scientific research. The court believed such questions had already been an-

swered by Roe and Casey, stating: "The Court sees no distinction
between fetuses in utero or ex utero."' 9 Commentators have noted,
however, that "the discussion of the embryo's status [as the subject of
scientific procedures] must necessarily stand on a different legal footing than that of the discussion of fetal abortion."9 1 The abortion cases
were decided in a normative adversarial context: The woman's right
to control her own body was pitted against the fetus's proposed right
to be born.92 Roe and its successors make clear that a woman's liberty
interests in reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity often outwise available federal funding to competing researchers who use human embryos, and
that Michael Polincastro and others with Down's Syndrome would be threatened with
loss of life by embryo research, which devalues and condones the destruction of
human life. Id.
86. Id Specifically, the complaint requested: (1) a declaration that the Panel violated the FACA's fair balance requirement; (2) dissolution of the Panel; (3) an injunction against future meetings; and (4) a declaration that all actions undertaken by the
Panel were null and void in their entirety. See International Found. for Genetic Research v. Shalala, 57 F.3d 1066 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision), available
in 1995 WL 361174, at *1 (recounting plaintiffs specific demands).
87. Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1426. The court's "further reason" for dismissing the
complaint was that the matter was non-justiciable: Because there were insufficient
judicial standards to address alleged "imbalances" in the membership of such committees, the court refused to decide the issue. Id. at 1430. Rather, "[tihe concerns of this
suit properly belong before the executive and legislative branches of government, not
the judicial." Id. at 1431.
88. Id. at 1426.
89. Id In 1995, the Fourth Circuit entertained the plaintiffs' appeal, but vacated
the lower court's judgement and remanded the action for dismissal, because their request had become moot upon the issuance of the Panel's Report. Genetic Research,
1995 WL 361174, at *2 ("The actions that the appellants seek to enjoin have already
occurred and cannot be undone. Accordingly, their claim for injunctive relief is
moot." (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
90. Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1426.
91. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1597, 1652 (1993); see Annas, supra note 25 (urging the separation of abortion politics from the discussion of embryo research); The Ramsey
Colloquium, supra note 23, at 1 ("The question of creating, using, and destroying
human embryos cannot be separated entirely from the question of abortion, but the
two questions can and should be distinguished."); cf. infra note 97-98 and accompanying text (observing fundamental differences between abortion and embryo research).
92. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (endorsing a woman's right to
abortion and rejecting the fetus's proposed rights as a person, under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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weigh the State's interest in protecting unborn life.9 3 Similarly, the
IVF cases were decided against the background of reproductive
choice. 9n Despite disagreement over the embryo's legal status, 95 these
cases confirm that the parents' mutual
decisional authority is the pri96
mary concern in an IVF dispute.
Experimentation involving deliberately fertilized embryos, however, is fundamentally different from both the abortion and IVF scenarios because individual reproductive autonomy is not implicated. 97
The woman is wholly removed from this equation: The research embryo is an independent entity whose existence does not require a woman to sacrifice her constitutionally protected autonomy. 98 The
biological parents do not assert any rights to control the disposition of
the potential child. Instead, only the researchers' right to investigate
and the general public's interest in obtaining beneficial information
from such experiments must be balanced against the embryo's proposed right not to be created and destroyed for the sole purpose of
scientific research. Part II turns to an evaluation of this unique interrelationship.

II.

ANALYSIS OF RELATIVE RIGHTS

The preceding discussion has considered existing legal understandings of the embryo. The focus in each is on relative rights: In the
abortion cases, a woman's right to bodily integrity and reproductive
autonomy often outweighs the government's interest in preserving un93. See supra Part I.A; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (majority of the court either affirming or declining to address the constitutional validity of the central holding of Roe); Thomburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (affirming the central holding of
Roe), City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(same).
94. See, e.g., supra note 62 (discussing the conflict between the right to procreate
and the right to avoid procreation in Davis).
95. See supra note 37.
96. See supra note 78.
97. Research involving "surplus" embryos may be more complex. Experiments using these embryos might be conducted to explore the reproductive health or status of
the mother as part of an IVF protocol and, thus, could implicate reproductive autonomy. Cf June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures,27 Pac. L.J. 1331, 1380 (1996) (arguing that laws completely prohibiting procedures that use embryos to gather information for the purpose of making reproductive choices or promoting procreation are
unconstitutional); Lal, supra note 19, at 537 ("[A] law banning IVF would undoubtedly be found unconstitutional because it would interfere with the right to
procreate.").
98. One of the most notable proponents of the right to abortion admits that,
"[b]ut for its biological dependence on the woman, it is at least arguable that the fetus
could be regarded as a holder of rights under the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, as well as the equal protection clause of the latter." Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330, 340 (1985).
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born life;9 9 in the IVF cases, parents' joint decisional authority is likewise paramount °° The key question in the research embryo context,
however, is whether the scientist's interest in performing her research
and the general public's interest in learning from its results should
outweigh whatever interests support protection of the embryo. This
Part evaluates these competing interests from both sides of the embryo research debate and argues that the balancing of these interests
requires that scientists be prevented from creating embryos solely for
scientific use.
A.

The Right to Research

Many commentators have suggested that the Constitution protects
a scientist's right to conduct research.'
Broad readings of various
Supreme Court opinions appear to support this position. For example, the Court acknowledged in Meyer v. Nebraska' that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the freedom "to acquire useful
knowledge."'0 3 Furthermore, in Branzburg v. Hayes,"° the Court
stated that, "[tihe informative function asserted by representatives of
the organized press ... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists."'' 0

John Robertson, one of the leading legal scholars in the area of reproductive technologies," °6 takes a less direct approach to this constitutional query.' 0 7 He begins by considering a ban on publication of
99. See supra Part I.A.
100. See supra Part I.B.
101. Michael D. Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research,
19 Ariz. L. Rev. 893, 894-95 (1977); Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Gallileo, and Government Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53
Wash. L. Rev. 349, 372-88 (1978); Jean Macchioroli Eggen, Tie "Onvellian
Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Frameworkfor Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 625, 653-57 (1991); James R. Ferguson, Scientific
Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 639, 644 (1979); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 S. Cal. L Rev.
1203, 1216-18 (1977). But see Stephen L. Carter, The Belhnan, the Snark, and the
BiohazardDebate,3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 358,369-73 (1985) (questioning whether the
First Amendment protects the right to research); Gary L. Francione, Erperimnentation
and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. Pa. L Rev. 417, 430-59
(1987) (rejecting the theory that freedom of research as an essential component of full
participation in the marketplace of ideas provides a basis for First Amendment
protection).
102. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
103. Id at 399.
104. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
105. Id at 705 (emphasis added).
106. See Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Erception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreative Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DePaul L. Rev. 523, 541-42 (1994) (observing Robertson's distinction the field). John
Robertson is the Thomas Wyatt Gregory Professor at the University of Texas School
of Law. Robertson, supra note 23, at FNa.
107. See Robertson, supra note 101, at 1251-53.

2448

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

research results, which would most certainly violate a researcher's
First Amendment right to free speech."" 8 Robertson then argues that
the underlying research activity, as an essential precursor to publication, is protected as well, in light of Supreme Court precedents that
safeguard similar precursors. 10 9 The Court has extended First
Amendment protections to: financing, the antecedent to speech in the
political arena; 110 learning and education, the antecedents to students
and teachers' speech;"' and gathering of news, the antecedent to reporting the same." 2
Under Robertson's theory, however, virtually all conduct could be
considered the precursor to some kind of speech."' "If ...all claims
of experimentation were given prima facie protection and all regulations of experimentation were required to meet first amendment standards... [a]ny self-proclaimed scientist could require that regulation
of her proposed experiment satisfy heightened scrutiny.""' 4 Rather,
as a National Bioethics Advisory Commission recently concluded in
its report on human cloning, "[t]he freedom to pursue knowledge is
distinguishable from the right to choose the method for achieving that
knowledge .... [T]he government . . .may and should restrict or
prohibit the means used by researchers if they involve sufficient harm
to others.""' 5 Thus, courts that have squarely considered the issue
have concluded that "the rights of medical researchers are not fundamental under the Constitution ....
B.

Public Benefit

In addition to scientists' interest in pursuing their work, embryo research is supported by considerable medical advances that might be
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-92 (1978) (striking a
Massachusetts statute that forbade certain kinds of corporations from contributing to
candidates for public office or to referenda campaigns); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
16 (1976) (holding that the government's interest in preventing corruption was sufficient to justify limiting the amount an individual may contribute to a campaign, but
striking expenditure ceilings as unconstitutional restrictions on the right to political
expression and association).
111. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
112. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972).
113. Francione, supra note 101, at 501 (criticizing Robertson's theory).
114. Id.
115. Cloning Report, supra note 4, at 79.
116. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd sub nom. Wynn v.
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181,
220 (E.D. La. 1980) (stating that medical researchers do not have a constitutionally
protected right to experiment on fetuses); Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 Pac. L. Rev. 1403, 1406 (1983) (arguing that all
scientific research is subject to regulation because it is action, not speech).
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achieved from conducting experiments of this nature.' 17 For instance,
embryo research may further develop and improve clinical protocols
for the treatment of infertility." 8 While IVF procedures are widely
available in the United States," 9 their efficiency is quite low: Less
than five percent of oocytes collected give rise to live-born children. 20
Studies of the external factors associated with the in vitro culture environment, research into the biochemistry and metabolism of the early
embryo, and the development of diagnostic testing for implantation
embryos have great potential to improve2 the rate of IVF success and
to assist infertile couples in the future.' '
The potential benefits of human embryo research extend well beyond infertile couples.'" Studies for pre-implantation diagnosis of genetic and chromosomal abnormalities seek to assist couples who,3
though fertile, are at high risk for genetic disease in their offspring.12
This experimental procedure would allow parents to choose-prior to
implantation-whether to pursue a pregnancy that might result in a
severely ill or handicapped child.'2 4 In addition, embryo studies may

help researchers devise new methods of contraception and further the
scientific understanding of human development, cancer, and transplant biology." Human embryo research is also
an essential compo1 26
nent of the development of cloning techniques.
The NIH Panel believed that the public's interest in obtaining beneficial information from these experiments warranted performance of
(and federal funding for) embryo experimentation-even where it involved the deliberate creation of research embryos.127 Deliberately
fertilized embryos are sometimes a practical necessity in studies of oocyte maturation, fertilization processes, and maternal-fetal drug interactions.'28 Moreover, restriction of research embryos might slow
117. Karen Dawson, Introduction: An Outline of Scientific Aspects of Human Ema.

bryo Research, in Embryo Experimentation 3, 3 (Peter Singer et al. eds., 1990) (stating that embryo experimentation is "a unique opportunity for the study of human
reproduction and early development, with far-ranging implications for the treatment
of infertility and for other areas of research").
118. Id.at 9-10.
119. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at 11.
120. See Van Blerkom, supra note 6, at 14; see also Dawson, supra note 117, at 9
("[Albout three out of each hundred eggs collected [in IVF treatment] %%ill result in a
live birth.").
121. Van Blerkom, supra note 6, at 9-17.

122. See Dawson, supra note 117, at 3.
123. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 180; Dawson, supra note 117, at 11.
124. Dawson, supra note 117, at 11.
125. Id. at 6-8; Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 180; Mark W.J. Ferguson, Contemporary and Future Possibilitiesfor Hunan Embryonic Manipulation, in Experi-

ments on Embryos 6, supra note 77, at 16-20.
126. See Steinbock, supra note 10, at 34-37 (discussing George Washington University researchers' successful cloning of a human embryo).
127. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5,at 50-51.

128. Id. at 42-43. For example, the only way to determine whether a new contraceptive will be effective is to attempt fertilization. Id. at 43.
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scientific inquiry when "spare" embryos are unavailable or unsuitable 129 for research purposes, and a ban would be very difficult to enforce. 130 "Weighing the importance of this research for the well-being
of women and children, the Panel concludes that it would not be wise

to prohibit altogether the fertilization of oocytes for research purposes.' 31 Thus, the Panel approved the creation of research embryos
in limited circumstances
where serious and compelling reasons justi1 32
fied their use.
C.

The Interests in the Embryo

Any regulation of embryo experimentation necessarily rests on a
basic assumption that the embryo is an instance of human life and
inherently valuable. Both proponents and critics of embryo research
express a minimum agreement on this point; 133 they diverge not as to
whether, but to what degree, these lives should be protected.13 4 The
35

courts have also acknowledged that the embryo is a valued entity.'
The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence has continuously affirmed that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting potential life even where Constitutional rights are at stake. 136

The Supreme Court has never acknowledged, however, that the unborn have any independent rights beyond what a state may choose to
recognize. 137 Abortion opponents assert that the living embryo has an
affirmative right to life, which would impose an obligation on a pregnant woman to provide that which is necessary (for example, nine
129. "Because the gametes and embryos derived from couples experiencing certain
kinds of infertility tend to exhibit higher rates of abnormality, many of these embryos
will be unsuitable for research ...." Id. at 44.
130. Id. (noting that researchers could easily circumvent a ban on creation of research embryos by deliberately fertilizing excess embryos during couples' IVF treatments, then soliciting donation). But see infra Part II.D (rejecting this enabling
rationale which permits scientists to act unlawfully).
131. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at 50.
132. The Panel concluded that fertilization of research embryos would be appropriate "[w]hen the research by its very nature cannot otherwise be validly conducted ...
[and that the research] is potentially of outstanding scientific and therapeutic value."
Id. at 44-45.

133. Compare NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at 44 ("The Panel recognizes, however, that the preimplantation embryo merits respect as a developing form of human
life ....), with The Ramsey Colloquim, supra note 23, at 2 ("Honesty requires that
we speak [of the embryo] not simply [as] human life but [as] a human being.").
134. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
135. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) ("We repeat.., that the State
does have an important and legitimate interest ...

in protecting the potentiality of

human life."); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the
embryo is entitled to special respect as a developing form of human life), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 911 (1993).
136. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
137. See supra Part I.A.
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months of pregnancy) for that right to be realized. 31 The Supreme
Court has refused to acknowledge such a right primarily because of its
corresponding effect on women's autonomy. 3 9 Opponents of the deliberate fertilization of research embryos, however, claim that embryos have a negative right not to be created, used, and ultimately
destroyed for the sole purpose of scientific investigation.1 40 Recognition of this right would not impose affirmative obligations on others
but, rather, would require researchers to refrain from interfering with
the right's bearer.'41
Federal and state governments routinely protect negative rightsfor example, by requiring that doctors and researchers obtain informed consent before subjecting patients to any experimental treatment. 42 The Belmont Report 143 concluded that informed consent
was an essential component of the basic ethical principle of respect for
persons.'" This principle is founded on two moral convictions: "first,
that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second,
that those persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection.' 1 45 With respect to the latter, the Commission stated, "[Nlot
every human being is capable of self-determination .... Respect for

the immature and incapacitated may require protecting them as they
mature or while they are incapacitated ....Some persons are in need
of extensive protection, even to 146
the point of excluding them from activities which may harm them."'
138. Cf.Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[State-]compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right
to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of
physical harm.").
139. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 ("[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.").
140. See generally The Ramsey Colloquin, supra note 23; John Marshall, The Case
Against Experimentation, in Experiments on Embryos 55, supra note 77.
141. Cf. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 3-5 (discussing the Lockean distinction
between positive and negative rights).
142. See generally Fay A. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide (2d
ed. 1990) (analyzing the legal requirements of federal and state informed consent
laws).
143. The Belmont Report summarizes the findings of the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principlesand Guidelinesfor the Protectionof Human Subjects
of Research (April 18, 1979) <http.//www.hunger.brown.edu/AdministrationIResearchAdministration/belmont/belmont.html> [hereinafter The Belmont Report].
The Commission first gathered in February of 1976 to identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving
human subjects and to develop corresponding practical guidelines. Id. The Report is
intended to inform and instruct the activities of scientists, government agencies, and
federal employees. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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Clearly, embryos are incapable of giving consent to their own creation or use in experimental procedures. 1 47 In this sense, they are
much like minor children who are sought as research subjects. 148 It is
well-established that parents may give consent on behalf of their child
for therapeutic experimental treatments. 14 9 Ethicists disagree, however, as to whether non-therapeutic research on children is ever justified.' 5 0 Some oppose all such experiments because the children
cannot give consent.' 5 1 Others endorse proxy consent for non-therapeutic research
that poses no undue risk or discernable discomfort to
1 52
the child.
Research embryos, however, are even more vulnerable than minor
children. Experimental procedures are incidental to a child's existence; parents, as guardians, may choose whether to participate in such
activities to further their child's best interest. 1 53 In contrast, experimental procedures are the very purpose of a research embryo's creation; researchers, as guardians, will choose to participate in these
activities to further science and society's best interests. 54 Embryos
are the most immature and utterly incapacitated human entities, subjected to the inevitable risk and ultimate harm of manipulation and
destruction at the hands of researchers. 55 They are in need of extensive protection-even to the point of prohibiting
scientists from
56
breeding them as disposable research tools.'
Proponents of unrestricted embryo research argue, however, that
embryos are not entitled to the same protections afforded adults or
children. 57 The NIH Panel concluded that the embryo should not be
considered a "person" for the purpose of informed consent-and corresponding protection-until sometime later in development, when
"increasing possession of qualities ... make respecting it (and hence
147. Steinbock, supra note 10, at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Paul Ramsey, The Enforcement of Morals: Nontherapeutic Research on
Children, Hastings Center Report 6(4):21-30 (1976).
152. See, e.g., Peter G. Brown, Human Independence and ParentalProxy Consent,
in Who Speaks for the Child 209, 215-20 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds., 1982)

(suggesting that parental consent is appropriate for non-therapeutic medical procedures that will not otherwise harm the child and are in accordance with the child's
presumed wishes-such as donating a rare blood type to a sibling).
153. With respect to non-therapeutic research, parents might, at a minimum,
choose whether to participate in activities which are neutral to their child's best
interests.
154. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing science and society's interests).
155. The Ramsey Colloquium, supra note 23, at 6.
156. Part IV, infra, proposes a uniform federal ban on the creation and use of research embryos.
157. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercialization, in

Human Embryo Research, 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 39, 40 (1995); Maurizio Moi, Is the

Human Embryo a Person?No, in Conceiving the Embryo: Ethics, Law and Practice
in Human Embryology 151 (Donald Evans ed., 1996).
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limiting others' liberty in relation to it) more compelling. " tss
Although the embryo warranted "serious moral consideration," the
Panel believed that the embryo's lack of "most ...

qualities consid-

ered relevant to the moral status of persons" justified a lesser degree
of protection. 59
This reasoning, however, reduces personhood. and thus "protectability," to possession of certain characteristics which society deems
worthwhile-such as sentience or the ability to feel pain." The logical extension of this position is that "protect-ability" also decreases
with the decreasing possession of those qualities."' Taken to its extreme, this position has potential to threaten other members of society who lack or lose those favored qualities-such as the elderly,
handicapped, and mentally or physically ill-with decreased protection from harmful research, or even eugenics. b2 The question should
not be whether embryos are "protect-able" according to these arbitrary criteria, but whether embryos are instances of human life that
are in need of protection.1 63 The answer to the latter is most certainly
yes, because embryos are developing human lives" and researchers,
"must inevitably destroy [them] in order to gain the knowledge that
[they] want."' 65 The federal government should meet this need by
granting these immature and incapacitated entities a negative right
not to be created, used, and discarded for research purposes.
D.

Public Detriment

The risks associated with this type of experimentation are not confined to embryos alone. Research conducted with deliberately fertil158. The Ramsey Colloquiun, supra note 23, at 3 (quoting the NIH Panel Report).
159. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at x.

160. The NIH Panel concluded that the embryo's inability to feel pain and its lack
of brain activity, consciousness and self-awareness "'all support the conclusion that the

preimplantation embryo does not merit the same degree of moral protection given to
children or adult human beings." Id at 37. The Panel did acknowledge, however, that

this view faces "conceptual and practical difficulties." Id. at 38. Insistence on sentience and brain activity as criteria for personhood might require extending equal

moral respect to animals, a move that might "run[ I counter to our practices of using
animals... in scientific research." Id Additionally, a criterion of consciousness, reasoning, or self-conceptualization might result in the exclusion of newborns from the
"class of protected subjects." Id.
161. The Ramsey Colloquiwn, supra note 23, at 3.
162. "Eugenics" is a science that deals with the improvement of hereditary qualities
of a race or breed by social control of mating and reproduction. Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 783 (1986).

163. The Ramsey Colloquiun, supra note 23, at 3. This argument does not imply
that human tissues or cells also require protection. Unlike "[skin and intestinal tissue, [or] even eggs and sperm... the embryo from the earliest moment has the active
capacity to articulate itself into what everyone acknowleges is a human being. The
embryo is a being; that is to say, it is an integral whole with actual existence." Id. at 2.
164. See supra note 133.
165. Marshall, supra note 140, at 56.
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ized embryos has broader social ramifications which impact the
decision of whether to conduct these experiments.
The practice of realizing large profits from the sale of human embryos results in their commercialization. 66 Embryos are thereby reduced to commodities, insofar as they are treated as merchandise or
vendible goods. 167 Such practices can lead to exploitation and objectification of individuals and humanity as a whole. 168 Infertile women,
who are anxious to conceive and vulnerable to pressure from their
doctors, may agree to donate eggs for research despite personal reservations. 169 Fertile women may also be subject to exploitation if they
17
consent to risky 17 donation procedures in exchange for money. 1
The buying and selling of embryos not only devalues the embryos, but
also contributes to the denigration of gamete providers, by defining
them as mere sources of research materials. 17 In addition, financial
benefit instills a profit motive in medical
researchers, which itself can
173
yield serious conflicts of interest.
The risks of commercialization and commodification are particularly great when embryos are deliberately created for the sole purpose
of research. In her partial dissent from the NIH Panel Report, Dr.
Patricia King noted that, "[t]he fertilization of human oocytes for research purposes is unnerving because human life is being created
solely for human use. I do not believe that this society has developed
' 74
the conceptual frameworks necessary to guide us down this slope."'
Such activities reduce the embryo to nothing more than a research
tool.
Oddly enough, the NIH Panel concluded that commercialization
and commodification were reasons to permit, rather than prohibit, the
creation of research embryos. 175 If researchers were confined to using
166. Alpers & Lo, supra note 157, at 40. "Commercialization refers to the practice
of realizing large profits from the development and sale of techniques or products that
involve distinctive human material ... ." Id.
167. Id. "Commodification" refers to the symbolic devaluation of human life that

results from its commercial use. Id. Such concerns usually take two forms: "[Tlhe
idea of making money from the origins of human life offends those who believe
human embryos deserve more reverential treatment . . .[and] the discrepancy between the profits paid to researchers and those paid to the progenitors of the embryos
disturb those who criticize the profit motive in science." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. While donated sperm can be collected through ejaculation, ova are commonly
retrieved through a surgery called laparoscopy, which involves general anesthesia,
several small incisions in the abdomen, and removal of the ova through needle aspiration. Bonnicksen, supra note 7, at 148-49. Alternaively, egg collection can be performed non-surgically, by inserting the aspiration needle directly through the
abdomen and bladder or through the vagina. Id. at 149.
171. Alpers & Lo, supra note 157, at 44.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at A-3.
175. Id. at 44.

1998]

HUMAN EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION

2455

"surplus" embryos, "any intelligent administrator of any IVF program
[could], by minor changes in his [sic] ordinary clinical ways of going
about things, change the number of embryos that are fertilized."' ' b A
ban could also cause doctors to exert "particularly acute" pressure on
women in infertility programs to donate their remaining embryos."7
The NIH Panel's reasoning, however, encourages lawmakers to
avoid the problem merely because it is complex and difficult to solve.
Regulations of human embryo research, like any other laws, will entail
their own challenges and difficulties. Fear that scientists will attempt
to circumvent the laws'l--or that they will react inappropriately and
unethically' 79-however, should not justify inaction. Rather, donors
should be protected and researchers should be made accountable by
strict enforcement of the laws.
The government certainly has a legitimate interest in preventing
commercialization and commodification that may result from human
embryo research. 8 0 Individual states' attempts to address these concerns, however, are inadequate. Although some state laws prohibit
the sale of fertilized embryos,' 8 ' they do nothing to prevent the sale of
gametes (sperm and eggs), which can easily be converted into research
embryos through deliberate fertilization.'8 Payment for sperm and
eggs is widespread among American infertility clinics: sperm donors
typically receive $50, and egg donors receive $2,000, per donation."3
As the NIH Panel observed, prices for these "raw materials" are set
by supply and demand."" Thus, as research needs expand, so too will
the prospects for commercialization and commodification. The Panel
attempted to curb this potential by recommending that neither donors
nor "brokers" be permitted to receive payment (beyond compensation for expenses incurred) for gametes or embryos used in re-

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying note 176.
179. See supra text accompanying note 177.
180. Cf infra note 275 (noting the government's legitimate interest in preventing
the dangers inherent in developing research areas).
181. See infra note 244.

182. See Bonnicksen, supra note 7, at 150 (describing the process of laboratory fertilization of human embryos, wherein sperm and eggs are combined in a glass petri
dish, and noting that "[miost of the time fertilization occurs").
183. See Alpers & Lo, supra note 157. at 41.
184. See NIH Panel Report, supra note 5. at 54-55.
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search. 18 5 In the absence of comprehensive laws applicable 8 to
6
privately funded facilities, however, such practices go unchecked.1
E.

Balancing the Interests

The previous sections have assessed the relative interests at play in
the research embryo. The ultimate question, however, is whether a

weighing of these interests justifies the deliberate fertilization of
human life or require its prohibition.
Although a right to research is not clearly protected by the Constitution, 187 scientists nonetheless have an important interest in pursuing
their work. There is an equally strong governmental interest, however, in protecting community health, safety, and welfare.' 88 Researcher's interests are especially limited where their work involves
1 89
vulnerable individuals or those with diminished capacity to consent.

Regulation of medical experimentation is thereby proper, so long as it
is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. t9 0

The deliberate creation and use of embryos endangers the health

and safety of those research subjects1 9' and poses risks to the welfare
193

of society at large. 192 Because embryos are inherently vulnerable,
regulation is particularly appropriate to guard their safety and wellbeing. Restriction of embryo research is proper because it is rationally related to the government's interests in protecting unborn life and

185. Id. Critics have argued, however, that such a rule is inadequate because it
presents a "profit paradox," enabling scientific investigators to profit from research
but prohibiting donors from doing so. See Alpers & Lo, supra note 157, at 44-45. An
analogous difficulty arose in Moore v. Regents of the University of California,793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991). In that case, the California Supreme
Court refused to grant the plaintiff a property interest-and corresponding action for
conversion-in his cell line after doctors had extracted it from his body and used it in
research. Id. at 488. Justice Broussard noted in dissent that the majority's holding
failed to "elevat[e] these biological materials above the marketplace;" rather, it
stripped the patient of civil remedy while enabling researchers to "retain and exploit
the full economic value of their ill-gotten gains." Id. at 506 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
186. Again, in contrast, other countries such as Great Britain and Canada require
licensing of embryo research and prohibit all buying and selling of gametes and embryos. Alpers & Lo, supra note 157, at 41.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976).
189. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 220 (E.D. La. 1980) (stating that the
rights of medical researchers are particularly limited when the experiments involve
minors and fetuses and are non-therapeutic).
190. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 263 F.2d 661, 667 (5th Cir.
1959). If the right to research were held to be protected under the First Amendment,
regulations of medical experimentation would be subject to more rigorous scrutiny.
See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1392 (applying the substantial justification and narrow
tailoring requirements to restrictions on embryo research).
191. See supra text accompanying note 165.
192. See supra Part II.D.
193. See supra Part II.C.
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preventing commercialization and commodification of human life. 9 4
More importantly, such legislation is necessary to protect embryos
from activities that can only harm them.
Potential community benefit does not tip the scale in favor of embryo research. The benefits rationale endorsed by the NIH Panel and
other proponents19 5 of embryo research raises serious moral concerns. 19 6 While claiming to make its evaluations independent of a particular morality or philosophy,1 97 the Panel did exactly the oppositeby endorsing utilitarianism.1 9 Indeed,
[iut is a primitive and unreflective version of utilitarianism... but
the message is unequivocal: the end justifies the means. If there are
"serious and compelling reasons," it would seem that the end would
justify any means. Certainly it justifies producing, using, and destroying human beings who are valued only for their utility as tools
serving the purposes of scientific research. The Panel's is not a
"multi-factorial" judgement. There is ultimately only one factor:
199
scientific utility.
Recent historical events have taught the world that anticipated
community benefit cannot be absolute in any moral society. 2 1 In the
wake of the unspeakable crimes of Nazism, for instance, the
Nuremburg Code declared, "No experiment should be conducted
where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling
injury will occur ....
The noted ethicist Claude Bernard has also
stated that research which injures another should not be conducted
regardless of the benefits that might come to others.20 2 Such admonitions are particularly pertinent in the research embryo context, where
194. See supra Parts II.C-D.
195. See Robert Edwards, Ethics and Embryolog: The Case For Erperitnentation,

in Experiments on Embryos, supra note 77, at 42 (arguing that the benefits of human

embryo research justify its continued performance); Steinbock, supra note 10, at 29

(presenting John Harris's position that banning embryo research might be immoral

because there are millions of people who might have benefitted from that research
had it been performed).
196. Additionally, the benefits rationale is, to a certain extent, based on artificial
choices. Marshall, supra note 140, at 63.
"Would you allow experimentation on embryos which would lead to the relief of handicap?". Obviously the vast majority of the population is likely to

say yes when [the question] is presented in that way. The fact that experi-

mentation is very unlikely to lead to relief of handicap was not part of the
question.

Id
197. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5. at ix.
198. The Ramsey Colloquium, supra note 23, at 5 (criticizing the NIH Panel
Report).

199. Id
200. Id
201. The Nuremberg Code, reprintedin Robert J. Levine, Ethics and Regulation of
Clinical Research 425, 426 (2d ed. 1986).
202. The Belmont Report, supra note 143.
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scientists know from the outset that their procedures will result in the
destruction of human life.2 °3

This type of utilitarian rationale also runs contrary to the underpinnings of the medical profession itself. Although the medical community seeks to safeguard the health of all people, each physician or
researcher owes a primary and uncompromising duty to the individual

patient. 0 4 The Helsinki Declaration 0 5 of the World Medical Associa-

tion confirmed this basic principle underlying all experimental research: "Concern for the interests of the subject must always prevail
over the interest of science and society. 2'

°6

In research performed on

deliberately fertilized embryos, however, the latter prevails.2 7
Admittedly, some future benefit may be lost by preventing the creation and use of research embryos. Regulation may also frustrate the
work of some well-intentioned scientists. Opponents of this type of
research do not deny those probable outcomes. 0 8 The factors that
support embryo research do not, however, outweigh the present interests in the embryo and potential risks that counsel against it. This
Note, therefore, advocates a uniform ban2 0on
the deliberate creation,
9
use, and destruction of research embryos.

III.

CURRENT REGULATION OF EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION

The preceding discussion considered the relative rights at play in
the research embryo context and suggested that embryos should not
be created for scientific research. This Part examines the manner and
extent to which existing federal and state laws protect the interests
outlined above and identifies those laws' limitations and inadequacies.

203. Marshall, supra note 140, at 56; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text
(observing that both proponents and opponents of this research agree that the embryo is an instance of human life).
204. 18th World Medical Assembly, World Medical Association Declarationof Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects (1964), reprintedin Levine, supra note 201, at 427 [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki]; see Steinbock, supra note 10, at 27 (discussing the embryo as a
patient).
205. The World Medical Assembly identified the basic principles of biomedical research involving human subjects as a "guide to physicians all over the world." Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 204, at 428. Although they do not have the force of law,
the basic principles and ethical guidelines adopted are a most eloquent statement of
the "mission of the medical doctor to safeguard the health of the people." Id. at 427.
206. Id. at 428.
207. See supra text following note 153.
208. Marshall, supra note 140, at 63 ("In opposing experimentation [which leads to
the destruction of human embryos,] I recognize and do not hide the fact that some
advances in knowledge will be lost ... .
209. See infra Part IV.
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FederalLaw

The history behind federal funding of human embryo research
evinces uneasy disapproval of this type of experimentation. Since
1980, the federal government has withheld funding for human embryo
research by de facto moratorium. 210 Until 1993, Congress authorized
federal funding of embryo research subject to approval of such
projects by a Department of Health and Human Services Ethical Advisory Board ("EAB").21 ' The first-and only-EAB appointed to
evaluate embryo research concluded that it was ethical as a theoretical
matter for the purpose of developing IVF techniques.21 2 Despite this
approval, the NIH neither took action on a specific project nor appointed additional EAB's, and funding was never allocated for
projects involving embryo research.213
The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993214
eliminated the EAB approval requirements of 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.204(d). 1 5 At that time, Congress believed embryo research was
a promising area, particularly for the treatment of infertility. 216 Members were concerned that the existing regulation hindered embryo research and left privately funded investigators to perform these
experiments without adequate medical and ethical guidelines. 17
Before allocating any funds, however, the NIH convened the
Human Embryo Research Panel. 218 The Panel gathered nineteen participants with expertise in clinical research, ethics, law, social science,
public health, and public policy to consider the moral and ethical implications of human embryo research, and to develop funding guidelines for that research.

9

After listening to testimony from more than forty witnesses and reviewing correspondence from 30,000 individuals, ' 0 the Panel concluded that embryo research should be funded by the federal
government. 221 The members found that human embryo experimen210. Blank & Merrick, supra note 1, at 185.
211. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1980). EAB's are an integral component of the

federal funding process. These panels are composed of specialists and representatives
of the general public who evaluate the medical, legal, social, and other issues related
to the subject matter of incoming grant applications. See id. § 46.204(a).
212. See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1338.
213. Id
214. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id § 121(c).
H.R. Rep. No. 103-28, at 80 (1993).
Id
NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at 3.
Id

220. Id. at 4. The Panel received letters, postcards, and petitions from private par-

ties and organizations, expressing views on human embryo research and some other
issues, such as abortion and fetal tissue research which were outside the Panel's scope.
Id.
221. Id. at xvii.
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tation would generate significant advances in scientific research-particularly in the areas of infertility, genetic defects, and disease
therapy.222 The Panel struggled, however, with the ethical implications of research conducted with deliberately fertilized embryos.2 23
While they did not define the precise moral or legal status of the embryo, they attempted to design their recommendations with "respect"
for the embryo as a symbol of human life.22 4 The Panel believed that
their guidelines and corresponding public funding would also stimulate ethical and scientific review of privately funded embryo
research. 2 5
The Panel specifically recommended that embryos be used sparingly and at the earliest possible stages of development.226 Use of embryos more than fourteen days past fertilization-the point at which
the "primitive streakI227 develops-was discouraged,228 though the
Panel approved the possibility of using them up to twenty-one days
after fertilization.229 It also urged that only embryos left over from
IVF treatments and donated voluntarily by parents be used for research purposes."3 The Panel did recommend, however, that researchers who desired to study aspects of fertilization and initial cell
division be permitted to deliberately inseminate unfertilized eggs
under limited circumstances. 231
The Advisory Committee to the Director of the NIH ("ACD") approved all of the Panel's recommendations-including the one permitting deliberate creation of research embryos-and passed the
recommendations on to the NIH Director, Harold Varmus, for the
ultimate funding decision.232 Within hours of that vote, however,
President Clinton stated: "I do not believe that federal funds should
be used to support the creation of human embryos for research purposes, and I have directed that the NIH not allocate any resources for
such research. ' '233 William Galston, deputy director of Clinton's Domestic Policy Council, later confirmed that the Clinton administration
had decided even before the ACD's meeting that deliberate creation
222. Id. at 65.
223. See id. at 35-51.
224. See id. at xii.
225. Id. at x.
226. Id. at 66-67.
227. The "primitive streak" is an advancing groove that develops about fourteen to
fifteen days after fertilization. This "milestone in embryo development" reveals the
embryo's head-tail and left-right orientations. Id. at D-7.
228. Id. at 67.
229. Id. at 78.
230. Id. at xi-xii, 68.
231. Id. at 50 (concluding that fertilization of research embryos is permissible only
for research with outstanding potential scientific and therapeutic value and which, by
its very nature, requires the deliberate fertilization of embryos).
232. Charo, supra note 34, at 14.
233. Id. (quoting Statement by the President on NIH Recommendation Regarding
Human Embryo Research, U.S. Newswire, Dec. 2, 1994).
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of human embryos for experimentation exceeded the public's tolerance for "exotic" research.23
The President's announcement did not prevent Varmus from imple-

menting the NIH Panel's other recommendations-such as renewed
funding for experimentation on "surplus" embryos.3 5 Congress, however, has since passed broader restrictions. Under Public Law 1057 8 ,f16 federal funds are presently unavailable not only for the creation
of research embryos, but also for any type of research in which human
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risks of
injury or death.2 7 In effect, the moratorium on federally-funded embryo research continues. No federal legislation, however, exists to
regulate embryo research conducted in the private sector.
B.

State Law

In the absence of federal regulation of privately funded embryo research, "private researchers can do whatever they please.., and it can
go on anywhere."" 8 In response, several states have implemented
statutory schemes to limit both privately and publicly-funded experimentation.3 9 While the lack of federal funding reflects-at a minimum-the American public's unwillingness to finance embryo
research, these state laws illustrate opposition to the research itself.
234. Charo, supra note 34, at 14.
235. Id.
236. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, 111 Stat. 1467.
237. Id. at 1517 (witholding all federal funds from embryo research conducted in
fiscal year 1998).
238. Julie Marquis & Lisa Richardson, Fertility Researchers Fear Taint from UC
Scandal, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1996, at A3 (quoting ethicist Ronald M. Green, voicing
concern over scientific abuses in the absence of federal oversight).
239. Ten states currently regulate embryo research to varying degrees. See Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 390.0111(5) (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting all research except that which preserves the life or health of the fetus); La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 9:122 (Vest 1991) (banning all investigational research on embryos and prohibiting the cultivation of
embryos for the same); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992) (prohibiting all
use of the product of conception in scientific research); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112,
§ 12J (Law. Co-op. 1991) (regulating the use of a live conceptus and banning nontherapeutic experimentation thereupon); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685 (West
1992) (banning non-therapeutic research on embryos, if that research substantially
jeopardizes the embryo's life/health or if the embryo is the subject of a planned abortion); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422 (West 1989) (banning all use of a conceptus in scientific research except where it is "harmless" to the conceptus); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 168-B:15 (1994) (limiting the maintenance of non-frozen pre-embryos ex utero to
fourteen days and prohibiting the transfer of a research pre-embryo to a uterine cavity); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 (1991) (criminalizing the use of a fetus in experimentation except where the purpose is to determine/preserve the life/health of the
fetus or mother); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216 (West Supp. 1997) (criminalizing all
non-therapeutic research on the conceptus); R-I. Gen. Laws. § 11-54-1 (1994) (prohibiting experimentation on living embryos except as necessary for the life or health of
the mother).
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The most lenient of the restricting states is New Hampshire, which

permits embryo experimentation, but limits it to the first fourteen
days after fertilization and forbids transfer of such an embryo into a
woman for implantation.240 Intermediate states, such as Michigan,
permit experimentation only if it does not pose any increased risks to
the embryo.24 ' The most conservative states fully ban investigational
embryo research. Louisiana, for example, requires that any use of an
embryo in vitro be intended for eventual in utero implantation and
development. 242 Louisiana also directly addresses the issue of deliber-

ately-created embryos, insofar as it prohibits the "farm[ing]" of
human embryos for research purposes. 243 Even states that do not expressly limit experimentation, however, address concerns over commercialization of embryos by limiting the sale, transfer, or distribution
of embryos for valuable consideration. 4 4

State regulations of embryo research have not gone unchallenged.
On three separate occasions, federal courts have evaluated claims that

such regulations violate fundamental constitutional rights.2 45 The only
successful basis courts have used to invalidate these statutes, however,
has been the Fourteenth Amendment "void for vagueness"
doctrine.2 4 6
In MargaretS. v. Edwards,24 7 the Fifth Circuit examined a Louisiana abortion statute that prohibited and criminalized experimentation
on any unborn child2 48 resulting from abortion, unless such experi240. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:15.
241. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685.
242. La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 9:122.
243. Id.
244. Eleven states and the District of Columbia prohibit the sale of embryos. D.C.
Code Ann. § 6-2601(b) (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 873.05(1)-(3) (West 1994); 755 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 50/8.1 (West 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:122 (West 1991); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 145.422(3) (West 1989); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216(b)(3) (West Supp.
1997); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 48.02 (West Supp. 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-311
(1997); Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1997); see GA Code Ann. § 16-12160(b)(5) (1996) (allowing payment for embryos to be used for health services education); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2690 (West 1992) (prohibiting payment for embryos used for illegal purposes); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 11-54-1(0 (1994) (disallowing
commercialization of unlawful embryo transfers). Four states specifically prohibit the
sale of embryos for research purposes. See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12(J)(a)(IV) (Law Co-op 1991); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 333.10204(1) (West 1992); N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.2-02(4) (1991).
245. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
246. See, e.g., infra note 256 and accompanying text (defining the "void for vagueness" doctrine).
247. 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
248. The court recognized that because the Louisiana statute defined "unborn
child" as "the unborn offspring of human beings from the moment of conception
through pregnancy and until termination of the pregnancy," it applied to embryos.
Edwards, 794 F.2d at 998 n.10 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.1(2) (West
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ments were therapeutic to the child.2 49 The plaintiffs" ° opposed the
statute on three grounds. First, they alleged that the law unconstitutionally burdened a woman's right to choose an abortion insofar as it
criminalized procedures that were necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother-namely, post-abortion procedures that might
benefit the mother, but not the child." Second, they argued that the
law unconstitutionally burdened the medical doctors' right to do research." 2 Finally, they urged that the language of the statute was unconstitutionally vague." 3
1992)). According to this definition, the Louisiana statute would apply to all human
embryos, whether fertilized for research or implantation in a woman.
Inconsistent terminology in this respect, however, raises additional vagueness concerns. As one NIH Panel advisor noted, many state laws ignore the scientific distinction between "embryo" and "fetus." Lori B. Andrews, State Regulation of Embryo
Research, in National Institutes of Health, Papers Commissioned for the Human Embryo Research Panel 297, 298 (1994); cf supra note 5 (stating the different scientific
definitions for "embryo" and "fetus"). Some state fetal research laws, such as Louisiana's, define the term "fetus" or "unborn child" to include the embryo. Some laws
fail to define the meaning altogether, but are recognized as applying to embryos. Andrews, supra, at 298; see, eg., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (Vest 1992) (prohibiting the use of any live extrauterine fetus or product of conception for any form of
experimentation) (recognized as applying to embryos in the NIH Panel Report's Appendix A). Other statutes use the term "conceptus" to apply to embryos. See, e.g.,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422 (West 1989) (prohibiting non-therapeutic use of "a living
conceptus"). "Pre-embryo" is another common term used to refer to the embryo
prior to implantation. See NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at D-7; see also Marshall,
supra note 140, at 63 (observing that the embryo research debate has given birth to
this novel terminology). These ambiguities can be easily resolved by defining the
terms from the outset, and must be clarified to give researchers and the general public
adequate notice of the scope of these statutes.
249. Edwards, 794 F.2d at 998. Plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of
another portion of the Louisiana statute, which required the attending physician to
inform a woman of her disposal options for the fetal remains within twenty-four hours
of her abortion. Id at 997. The court struck this provision as unconstitutional, based
on the Supreme Court's prior holding that a statute which required that a physician
(rather than other health care workers) disclose informed consent information was
unconstitutional. Id at 998 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)).
250. This suit was a class action brought on behalf of pregnant women who desired
abortions, three physicians who performed abortions, and five clinics that provided
abortion facilities. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 642 (E.D. La. 1984) (lower
court opinion), affid sub. nom. on modified grounds,Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1986).
251. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 673. Arguably, experimental procedures might include
pathological testing to diagnose infections or illnesses in women who have undergone
abortion. Id
252. Id; see supra Part II.A (discussing scientists' right to research).
253. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 672. The disputed statute stated, -[n]o person shall
experiment on an unborn child or on a child born as the result of abortion, whether
the unborn child or child is alive or dead, unless the experimentation is therapeutic to
the unborn child or child." Id at 671 n.29 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.13
(West 1992)). Plaintiffs argued that the statute was unclear as to what was included in
the category of "dead or alive child born as the result of an abortion." Id. at 672.
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The lower court found merit in each of the plaintiffs' arguments and
declared the provision unconstitutional. 4 On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision on the sole ground that the terms
"experiment" and "experimentation" rendered the statute impermissibly vague.2 15 A statute is void for vagueness under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it "is inherently standardless,
enforceable only on the exercise of an unlimited, and hence arbitrary,
discretion vested in the state. '2 56 The court was swayed by the expert
testimony that physicians do not, and cannot, clearly distinguish between medical "tests" and medical "experiments"-many medical
treatments can be described as both. 57 One doctor explained that
"experimentation" can have at least two distinct meanings: 1)
"[W]hen you do things to see - just wonder 'What would happen if I
did this . . . what would be the outcome[?]' " and 2) performing a
procedure "without a 'data base of many cases to rely upon.""'2 " Because the statute "simply [had] no core" that applied to specific activities, it was held to be unconstitutional" 9
The Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in evaluating a Utah
2 6 ° Unlike the Louifetal experimentation law in Jane L. v. Bangerter.
26
1
siana law, this Utah criminal statute
permitted discretionary experimentation aimed at acquiring genetic information about the embryo
or fetus. 262 The district court upheld the statute by narrowly interpreting "experimentation" to mean "tests or medical techniques
which are designed solely to increase a researcher's knowledge and
are not intended to provide any therapeutic benefit to the mother or
child. 2 63 The Court of Appeals reversed, however, asserting that the
district court "blatantly rewrote the statute, choosing among a host of
competing definitions for 'experimentation.' "264 Judge Seymour went
on to attack the sufficiency of the definition itself, insisting that "benefit" was an equally uncertain term. 265 Because the law did not clearly
demarcate criminal conduct from permitted action, the court held it to
be unconstitutionally vague. 6 6
254. Id. at 673-76.
255. Edwards, 794 F.2d at 999.
256. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1983)).
257. Id.
258. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing expert testimony from Treen, 794 F. Supp. at 994).
259. Treen, 794 F.2d at 999 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974))
(emphasis deleted).
260. 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
261. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-310 (1995).
262. Bangerter, 61 F.3d at 1499-1500.
263. Id. at 1501 (citation omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1502.
266. Id.
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In Lifchez v. Hartigan,267 the Northern District of Illinois scrutinized the term "therapeutic." 2" The challenged statute criminalized
fertilization of embryos for the purpose of experimentation, unless
such research was "therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced."2 69 The
statute also stated that it was not intended to prohibit the performance of IVF.27° The court noted that various experimental procedures, such as embryo transfer 27' and genetic screening, 2 were
arguably non-therapeutic but not clearly intended to fall within the
ban. 27 3 Again, because the legislature failed to specifically define
"therapeutic" in the statute, the court found it to be unconstitutionally

vague.27 4 Although none of the statutes challenged in the federal

courts have survived constitutional scrutiny, this precedent does not
pose a significant obstacle to the regulation of embryo research. None
of the above noted cases questioned the states' legitimate interest in
limiting the use of embryos in scientific experiments. 275 They merely
require that legislatures choose a definition for each term employed
and specify that meaning explicitly for the statutes to survive vagueness challenges. Mindful of this requirement, Part IV proposes legislation that can withstand judicial scrutiny.
IV.

PROPOSED STATUTE

Neither potential community benefit nor freedom of scientific inquiry justify the deliberate fertilization of human embryos for investigational embryo research.276 The creation and use of research
embryos is a serious misuse of human life which threatens its subjects2 7 7 and society in general.27 1 The federal government has acknowledged this problem by refusing to finance any embryo
experimentation 2 7 9 but its policy affects only those researchers who
rely upon federal funds." ° Regulations of private research activities
267. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
268. See id
269. Id. at 1363-64 (quoting I11.
Rev. Stat. Ch. 38 S 81-26, § 6-7 (1989)).
270. Id.
271. Embryo transfer is part of IVF procedures whereby a pre-implantation embryo is introduced into the uterus or fallopian tube. See NIH Panel Report. supra note
5, at D-4.
272. Genetic screening is a synonym for pre-implantation diagnosis. See supra note
15.
273. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
274. Id. at 1376.
275. In a precursor case to MargaretS. v. Edwards, the district court explicitly held
that Louisiana has a legitimate interest in regulating embryo experimentation to protect its citizens from the "dangers of abuse inherent in any rapidly developing field."
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 (E.D. La. 1980).
276. See supra Part II.A-B.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See supra Part II.D.
279. See supra Part III.A.
280. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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vary from state to state2 8 ' and are prone to constitutional challenges
due to vague statutory language. 2" A uniform ban on the creation of
embryos for investigational embryo research, one that both affords
embryos negative rights and clearly defines the limitations on researchers, is therefore both appropriate and necessary. Accordingly,
this Note proposes the following federal 8 3 bill:
A BILL
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Research Embryo Act."
SECTION 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST CREATION OF
HUMAN EMBRYOS FOR INVESTIGATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH
(a) DEFINITIONS:
For the purposes of this statute: (1) "Creation" of a human embryo
means the fertilization of a human ovum with human sperm; (2)
"Embryo" means the living organism resulting from fertilization; (3)
"Gamete" means the egg (ovum) or sperm (spermatazoa); and (4)
"Investigational embryo research" means tests, techniques, or procedures which are designed to increase the knowledge of the researcher or scientific discipline, but are not intended to diagnose or
improve the life or health of the embryo or individual biological
parent, and which result in the destruction of the embryo.
(b) IN GENERAL:
281. See supra note 239.
282. See supra Part III.B.
283. The federal government's authority to promulgate a law like this might be
drawn from the Interstate Commerce Clause, which likewise gives Congress the
power to establish the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to promote public
health and safety. See Camohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980). FDA
Commissioner Michael A. Friedman recently invoked that authority, warning researchers that the federal government would promulgate and enforce restrictions
against human cloning-another procedure which presents "serious health and safety
issues" for its subjects. FDA Warns Against Human Cloning Attempt, L.A. Times, Jan.
20, 1998, at B8. A bill now pending in the Senate to ban cloning permanently may
indirectly restrict the use of research embryos. S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998) ("PROHIBITION ON HUMAN CLONING. § 3 (a) IN GENERAL. - It shall be unlawful for
any person to- (1) clone a human being; or (2) conduct research for the purpose of
cloning a human being or otherwise creating a human embryo." (emphasis added)).
Due to the tentative climate of the cloning debate, however, a separate law dealing
exclusively with research embryos is necessary. See Cloning Report, supra note 4, at
109 (suggesting that in three to five years the government re-evaluate the current
recommendations against the cloning of humans).
Nevertheless, the issues of cloning and embryo research are inextricably intertwined. Last summer, Edmund Pellegrino, Professor of Medicine and Medical Ethics
at Georgetown University, testified before Congress that failure to permanently ban
cloning "begs the question of the moral wrong of human embryo experimentation
which is the first and essential step in any cloning of human beings." Ethics and Theology: A Continuation of the National Discussion of Human Cloning, S. 541-41, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Edmund D. Pellegrino, Cloning Human Beings-The
Moral Necessity of a PermanentBan).
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It shall be unlawful for anyone to- (1) create a human embryo for
use in investigational embryo research; or (2) conduct investigational embryo research using a human embryo created for that purpose; or (3) buy, sell, or otherwise transfer human gametes for
creating a human embryo to be used in investigational embryo
research.

SECTION 3. SANCTIONS (a) CIVIL PENALTIES: Whoever
knowingly or recklessly violates any part of Section 2(b) shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each such
violation. (b) INELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL FUNDS: Any
individual or institution found to knowingly or recklessly violate
Section 2(b) shall be ineligible to receive federal funding for research of any kind for a period of five years after such violation.
This statute addresses and overcomes the problems that have
plagued state laws in the past. Section 2(a) clearly defines the meaning of each term employed, giving researchers adequate notice of the
statute's scope and application.' Section (2)(a)(2) defines "embryo"
in accordance with its scientific definition.3gs Section 2(a)(4), in defining "investigational embryo research," does not employ subjective
terms like "experimental,"" 6 "benefit," 2 7 or "therapeutic."'
Rather, it broadly covers any procedure which is designed to increase
the knowledge of the researcher or scientific discipline, but is not intended to gather information about the health of the embryo or individual biological parent." 9 Thus, the deliberate fertilization and use
of human embryos for basic research and studies designed to improve
IVF techniques as a whole 29 -which are conducted without regard to
the welfare of the gamete providers or individual embryos-would be
prohibited. This statute does not, however, address the performance
of pre-implantation diagnosis, which is designed to determine the genetic status of an embryo in conjunction with an IVF protocol.291 Nor
would it affect the performance of arguably experimental IVF techniques,2 9 so long as they are designed to improve the life of the biological parent by helping them conceive a child.
284. Cf.supra Part III.B (discussing state laws that were held unconstitutional because they failed to define "experiment" and "therapuetic").
285. See supra notes 5, 248.
286. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
287. See supra text accompanying note 265.
288. See supra text accompanying note 274.
289. Cf.supra notes 263, 264 and accompanying text (noting that while judges are
not free to "choos[e] among a host of competing definitions" legislatures may-and
must-do so).
290. See supra Part II.B.
291. But see Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open
Future,28 Rutgers LJ. 549 (1997) (discussing the devisive moral implications of preimplantation diganosis).
292. Cf.supra text accompanying note 271 (discussing the Lifchez court's confusion
over whether the disputed statute encompassed "embryo transfer").
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The latter part of section 2(a)(4) refrains from interfering with reproductive autonomy by permitting experimentation that might be
performed to explore parents' reproductive status.2 9 3 This statute
would, conceivably, permit researchers to create human embryos for
tests or procedures solely relevant to the biological parent's health as
part of an IVF protocol. This is not, however, a current use for research embryos.2 94 The experiments for which deliberately fertilized

embryos are presently believed to be useful are limited to basic research and studies to improve IVF procedures as a whole. 295 Such
research is designed to increase only the knowledge of the researcher
or scientific discipline and results in the eventual destruction of the
embryo.2 9 6

This statute thus grants the human embryo a much-needed negative
right not to be created, used, and destroyed for the sake of scientific
research alone. 297 By prohibiting both fertilization of and experimentation on research embryos, section 2(b)(1) and (2) accomplish the
limited goal of banning research in which embryos are created expressly for that purpose. Section 2 further protects against commercialization and commodification by eliminating profit opportunities
for both researchers and donors.298
This statute also imposes severe sanctions, commensurate with the
serious nature of these activities. Section 3(a) imposes a $10,000 fine
on anyone who creates or uses a research embryo or purchases, sells,
or traffics gametes for creation of a research embryo. 99 Section 3(b)
also threatens individuals and institutions with the loss of federal
funding. 30 The scienter requirement, 30 1 however, exempts individuals
or institutions who innocently and unknowingly participate in such research. 2 These measures demand that researchers and research facilities vigilantly prevent abuses of the human embryo.
293. Cf. supra note 97 (noting possible Constitutional implications of restricting research designed for this purpose).
294. Cf. NIH Panel Report, supra note 5, at 42-44 (listing the potential uses for
research embryos, all of which constitute investigational embryo research).
295. Id. at 43.
296. See supra text accompanying note 165.
297. See supra Part II.C.

298. See supra Part II.D.
299. Cf H.R. 923, 105th Cong. § 2 (b) (1997) (proposing a maximum civil money
penalty of $5,000 for use of a human embryo in cloning); S. 1574, 105th Cong. § 3 (a)
(1998) (same); Lal, supra note 19, at 542 (proposing a $60,000 fine and an eight year
prison term for those who participate in the sale of gametes or embryos, and a $50,000
fine and five year prison term for those who use embryos without proper
authorization).
300. Cf. S. 1574, 105th Cong. § 3 (b) (1998) (proposing five year withdrawal of federal funds from any individual who participates in human cloning research).
301. Section 3 imposes sanctions only on those who "knowingly or recklessly" violate the statute.
302. In 1996, NIH officials discovered that Dr. Mark Hughes, an employee of the
National Human Genome Research Institute and a former member of the Human
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Most importantly, this statute achieves what is perhaps most lacking
in the present law: uniformity. The limitations and inadequacies of
existing federal3 3 and state laws 3° 4 permit the private sector to choose
where and how to conduct research with embryos, virtually free from
oversight.3 0° As a federal law of general applicability, this proposed
bill holds all researchers-regardless of their locale or source of funding-to the same standards of responsibility and respect for human
life.
CONCLUSION

While investigational embryo research offers benefits for medical
science, the harm inflicted on the human embryo and the risks to society at large caution against it-especially when such research involves
the deliberate creation of human embryos. The federal government
has recognized these dangers and refused to fund this type of experimentation. The federal laws, however, apply only to the activities of
those who accept federal funds. Individual states have also responded
by legislating against such research. State laws of general applicability, however, vary among jurisdictions, are often poorly drafted, and
consequently are vulnerable in the courts due to vagueness of statutory language. Without comprehensive and well-defined regulations,
the private sector is able to conduct virtually all embryo research without review or accountability.
The restriction proposed in this Note addresses this most egregious
misuse of human embryos. Such a law would prohibit all scientists
from creating and using unborn life for research purposes alone and
would help prevent the commodification and commercialization of
human embryos. Absent uniform laws, researchers are encouraged to
forum shop to find a jurisdiction with lax, or nonexistent, regulation of
their activities. Rather, scientists should be required to act responsibly and within the accepted boundaries of a society which values and
protects human life.

Embryo Research Panel, was secretly conducting illegal human embryo research with
NIH equipment and research fellows. Continued Management Concerns at the NIH,
105th Cong. H271-41 (1997) (testimony of Harold E. Varmus, NIH Hunman Embryo
Research Funding Policies). In October of that year, the NIH terminated its relationship with Dr. Hughes and has implemented broader policies to inform scientists of
their duties under present law. Id
303. See supra Part III.A.
304. See supra Part III.B.
305. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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